One of the most influential discoveries in modern science, the first law of thermodynamics (sometimes called the law of the THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (5) 2 205 mnservation of energy) was first reported by the German physician J. R. \'layer in 1842. But Mayer's revolutionary paper W<L~ rejected by the leading physics journal Annalell cler Physik and was eventually published in a relatively obscure and much less appropriate chemical journal. It was therefore .umost entirely ignored hy physicists, and, possiblv as a result of this. .\laver suffered a mental breakdown fi'om which he never reco;ered (Ziman 1976, pp. 103-4) . This is just 011(> dramatic example of the fallible judgments to which journal editors and referees are sometimes prone; I have cited some other equally shocking examples elsewhere (Colman 1979) .
Peters & Ceci (P & C) have reported some interesting empirical evidence from a controlled investigation of the peer-review system. Their data demonstrate that the system is vulnerable either to random error or to systematic bias, or possibly to both. The authors acknowledge that in order to test the hias hypothesis properly it would he necessary to compare the filte of resuhmitted artieies purporting to eome from high-status institutions with the fate of others purportedly from low-status institutions. Since this manipulation was not per formed, P & C's interpretation of their results as supporting the hias hypothesis lacks force, and I helieve that their statistical arguments against the random error hypothesis an' unsound.
Let us assume that the ultimate fate of a submitted manu script or an undetected resuhmission is a purely random event, unrelated to its quality or to the authors' reputations or their institutional affiliation. Suppose that there is a fixed probability p that the manuscript will he accepted and a probability of q = 1 -P that it will be rejected. (In reality, of course, there are other possible outcomes apart from outright acceptance and outright rejection, hut I shall ignore this complication as P & C have done.) If the number of submitted -or resubmitted and undetected -manuscripts is N, then the exact probability P(x) that x of them will he accepted is given by the hinomial probability nmetion:
The logical derivation of this formula is explained from first principles in Colman (1981, chapter 4). P & C correctly statc that if N = 9, p = .43, and q = .57, then the probability ofless than two acceptances -that is, one or zero acceptances -is P(l)
This does not. however, answer the question, How improb able is the observed outcome ofless than two acceptances out of nine on the basis of chance alone given the actual acceptance mte (20 percent) of the journals studied? The required proba bility is obtained by setting N = 9, p = .20, and (I = .SO. Then. according to my electronic abacus, the probability of less than two acceptances is P(l) + P(O) = .44. This means that, 011 the assumption of purely random selection, the probability of an outcome as extreme as that observed by Peters and Ceci is .44, which is certainly not low by any standards. Furthermore, the expected number of acceptances, given the ahove parameters, is Np = 1.80, which is fairly dose to the observed outcome of one acceptance (the standard deviation is 1.20). In other words, if the experiment were repeated many times, then between Olle and two manuscripts. on average, would be accepted per experiment. It seelllS imprudent, therefore, to reject the hypothesis that the fate of the manuscripts resubmitted hy P & C was determined purdy randomly. This does not, of course, prove that bias was absent, hut Occam's razor bids us to reject the hias hypothesis in favor of the null hypothesis of randoJll selection.
P & C attempted to show that the relative fi-equency of tlVorahle reviews by referees and editors was significantly less for the resuhmissions than for the original submissions. Using a conservative estimate of the latter, they rejected the null hypothesis of no significant difference on the basis of a chi 206 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (5) 2 square test. Unfortunately. this conclusion is invalid because editors' reviews are clearly influenced by those of their ref erees; hence the crucial assumption of stochastic indepen dence of observations underlying the chi square statistical model was violated in P & C's ealculation. It cannot, therefore, he inferred that the r('submissions received significantly fewer tlVorahle reviews than the original submissions, or that the observed outcome was '"quite improbable," as P & C daim.
Whether referees anel editors are systematically biased or operate in a quasi-random fashion, the peer-wview system evidently lacks validity. When referees claim to have found serious flaws in a manuscript, therefore, there is no a priori reason to assume that they are right and the authors are wrong.
If editors lack sufficient specialized knowledge to evaluate the criticisms, how ought they to respond to unfavorable referees' reports? The following procedure, which has been successfully used by the new journals Current Psychological Research and Current Psychological Reviews, seems to me to be most fair. The authors should be sent the referees' criticisms and be invited to rehut them if they consider them invalid. The original manuscript, together with the referees' criticisms and the authors' rebuttals. should then be submitted to an inde pendent arbiter for a final verdict. This procedure would perhaps eliminate some of the more blatant injustices of the peer-review system and act as a corrective to referee error.
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The provocative paper by Peters & Ceci (P & C) further documents persistent problems of unreliability and possible bias in the peer-review practices common to professional journals in the behavioral and physical sciences. As an associate editor of a psychology journal (Behavioral Assessment) I was surprised at P & C's finding that the same article was not recognized by the editors who had handled it just 18 to 32 months earlier. This is especially surprising in view of the manuscript's acceptance the first time around, since accepted papers are usually handled several times as they wind their way through revision, copy-editing, and final processing for publi cation. The forgetting of rejected manuscripts would be less surprising.
Nonetheless, the P & C results are compelling, and the editors apparently did forget. It is not the editors' faulty memory that is the primary focus of this study, nor of these comments, however. Editors of APA journals typically handle hundreds of manuscripts each year, and it is not expected, or even desirable, that they remember each one. Perhaps as sociate editors should be expected to do better, but even for them the implications of the P & C findings are that editorial recollection is hut one element in a complex, often hastily enacted process that requires serious study and our commit ment to overhauling.
Such study would begin with an analysis of the variables controlling the reviewing process. Disagreement among ref erees is not surprising when it is realized that reviewers, typically prominent and overextended researchers themselves, work independently, under tight time constraints, with mini mal criteria to guide them, with no opportunity to question the author for clarification, with minimal feedback as to the adequacy of their reviews, and with few rewards for the long hours devoted to the process. Judgments by independent experts concerning simpler sets of stimuli than those repre
